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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code
Annotated 19 53, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISS
POULSEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE
OF THE CITY'S CASE IN CHIEF?

This is a conclusion of law, and should be reviewed on a
"correctness" standard.
II.

State

v.

Pena,

869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) .

IS WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE 23-5-102
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD?

A trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss based upon its
conclusion that the challenged statute is constitutionally valid
presents a question of law.

That decision should be reviewed under

a correction-of-error standard, granting no particular deference to

the trial court.

West

Valley

City

v.

Streetei,

849 P. 2d 613

(Utah App. 199 3).
III. WAS POULSEN'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
PROPERLY DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT?
The denial of a motion for a new trial is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, should be given deference, and
should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Thomas,

830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992); State v.

1994) .

1

Pena,

State

v.

869 P.2d 932 (Utah

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
West Valley City Municipal Code:
23-5-102. Animals Running at Large.
It shall be unlawful for the owner or person having
charge, care, custody or control of any animal to allow such
animal at any time to run at large.
The owner or person
charged with responsibility for an animal found running at
large shall be strictly liable for a violation of this Section
regardless of the precautions taken to prevent the escape of
the animal and regardless of whether or not he knows that the
animal is running at large.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves a prosecution and conviction in the Third
Circuit Court, West Valley Department, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, for four counts of violating Section 23-5-102 of the West
Valley City Municipal Code, "Animals Running at Large."
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Prosecution in this case was commenced by the arrest of Lynn
Poulsen on or about February 15, 1994.

Following her arrest,

Poulsen filed numerous pretrial motions, including the following:
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Provide Evidence (Record, p. 21);
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Record, p. 57); Motion
to Take
p.

Deposition with Alternative

Recording

68) ; Motion to Dismiss Ordinance Void and

Device

(Record,

Unconstitutional

Hearing Requested (Record, p. 7 0) ; Motion for Severance of Charges
and Counts

(Record, p. 74); Motion in Limine

(Record, p. 77);

Motion for Payment of Witness Fees and Research Fees at Public

2

Expense

(Record, p.

82); Motion

to Disqualify

Judge

(Record,

p. 91); Motion to Suppress (Record, p. 109).
On July 5, 1994, the trial court judge granted Poulsen's
Motion to Dismiss the six counts of "Nuisance:

Animals."

The

trial court denied Poulsen's other motions.
A jury trial was held on July 5, 1994.

Following trial,

Poulsen filed a Motion for Arrest of Judgment or in the Alternative
Motion to Vacate Verdict of Guilty and Grant New Trial, and a
Motion for New Trial.

The trial court denied both of Poulsen's

motions on August 22, 1994.

Poulsen filed a Notice of Appeal on

August 30, 1994.
Subsequent to Poulsen's filing of the Notice of Appeal, she
filed a Motion for Payment of Transcripts of Court Proceedings for
Appeal.

The trial court denied this Motion on November 4, 1994.

Poulsen filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals,
appealing the trial court's denial of her Motion for Payment of
Transcripts.
court

in

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial

its

No. 940727-CA.

Memorandum

Decision

dated

May

11,

199 5,

Case

The Utah Supreme Court denied Poulsen's Writ of

Certiorari for review of the Court of Appeals' decision regarding
the payment of transcripts.
DISPOSITION

IN TRIAL COURT

At trial, Poulsen was convicted of four of the six counts
brought

against her

misdemeanor.

of

"Animals Running at Large," a class B

On August 3, 1994, the trial court judge imposed a
3

jail sentence of thirty days, which was suspended; a fine of $750,
$250

of

which

was

suspended;

and

ordered

that

Poulsen

could

complete fifty hours of community service in lieu of the $500 fine
that was due and owing.

The court also placed Poulsen on probation

for twelve months.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

At approximately 1:30 a.m. on February 15, 1994, West

Valley City Police Officer Cox responded to a report of horses
running at large at the approximate location of 2700 South 7000
West in West Valley City.
2.

Transcript, pp. 15-16, 18, 27.

Upon his arrival at the location, Officer Cox observed

six to eight horses loose on the streets of West Valley City.
Transcript, pp. 16-17, 20-22.
3.

Officer Cox, in conjunction with several Salt Lake County

Sheriff's Deputies, followed the horses as they traveled
northwesterly direction.
4.

Transcript, pp. 20-22.

Officer Cox momentarily lost contact with the horses as

they traveled through a field.
he again

in a

located

Transcript, pp. 22, 28.

the animals as they were entering

However,
a pasture

located at approximately 2100 South 7400 West, which is outside the
border of West Valley City.

Transcript, pp. 23-24.

Officer Cox

recognized the horses to the be same horses he had been pursuing in
West Valley City.

Transcript, p. 31.
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5.

When Officer Cox arrived at the pasture, Poulsen was

present and was directing the horses into the pasture and tying
them up.
6.

Transcript, pp. 24-25.
West Valley City Animal Control Officer Larsen and West

Valley City Police Officer Prisbrey made contact with Poulsen at
the pasture.

Transcript, pp. 37-38.

Poulsen demonstrated

a

familiarity with the pasture by warning the officers that it was
unsafe to enter it to pursue the horses.

Transcript, pp. 70-71.

Poulsen also demonstrated a familiarity with the horses by warning
the officers of one horse that had a tendency to kick and another
horse that was blind.

Transcript, p. 72.

Poulsen also identified

the pasture as belonging to her (Transcript, p. 119) and proceeded
to repair the fence around the pasture (Transcript, pp. 40-41).
7.

Poulsen was accompanied by her daughter

(Transcript,

p. 73) , who had arrived in a separate vehicle (Transcript, p. 108) ,
and who also demonstrated familiarity with the horses by riding one
bareback, with no halter or reins, to the back of the pasture
(Transcript, p. 44) and, along with Poulsen, by feeding the horses
with feed she removed from her vehicle
109).

(Transcript, pp. 45-46,

Poulsen initially denied owning the horses, but ultimately

accepted responsibility for them (Transcript, pp. 107, 120) and
admitted to Officer Prisbrey that four of the horses were hers
(Transcript, p. 120) .

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE PROPERLY DENIED
POULSEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE CITY'S CASE IN CHIEF,
SINCE SUFFICIENT FACTS HAD BEEN PLACED
INTO EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE
CASE.

At the conclusion of the City's case in chief, Poulsen moved
for a dismissal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence.

She

argued that the evidence presented to that point did not establish
a

prima

ordinance.

facia

violation

of

the

"animals

running

at

large''

The trial court property denied Poulsen's motion.

The

judge recognized that testimony had been presented establishing
both

essential

elements

of

the

offense.

First,

Officer

Cox

testified that the animals, in this case horses, had been seen
running at large down several streets in West Valley City.

Second,

Officer Larsen testified that Poulsen had helped contain the horses
in a pasture, had repaired the pasture fence, and had demonstrated
a familiarity with the horses consistent with her being in charge,
care, custody, or control of the horses.

This familiarity was

established by Poulsen's knowledge of the horses' characteristics,
such

as

their

blindness

and

tendency

to

kick;

the

horses'

willingness to come to her; her daughter's ability to ride one of
the horses bareback, without halter
horses.

6

or reins; and feeding the

II.

SECTION 23-5-102 OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OVERBROAD.

The language of the ordinance is clear and concise and does
not sweep otherwise legal conduct into its purview, nor does it
impinge upon any constitutionally protected conduct.
The ordinance is not unconstitutionally overbroad as applied
to the facts of this case.
were running at large.
admitted

ownership

of

It was uncontroverted that the horses

It was also uncontroverted that Poulsen
four

of

the horses.

These

facts

squarely within the conduct prohibited by the ordinance.

fall

Poulsen

does not have standing to argue that the ordinance may be overbroad
as applied to hypothetical facts or facts not before the court.
III. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF POULSEN'S ARREST AND
INCARCERATION,
AND
THE
PROSECUTOR'S
REMARKS RELATING TO THAT EVIDENCE, WERE
PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT AT
THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF POULSEN.
Poulsen's contention that the evidence was improperly admitted
by

the

trial

court

regarding

her

arrest

is

a

misrepresentation of the proceedings before the trial court.
prior

motion hearing,

the City had

evidence on this subject.

stipulated

not

gross
At a

to present

However, at the pretrial argument on

July 5, 1994, Poulsen specifically requested that the trial court
allow such evidence.

At her request, the previous stipulation and

order of the court was dissolved, and it was agreed that either
party could raise the circumstances of the arrest.
7

At trial,

Poulsen did not object to this testimony until it appeared to be
damaging to her.

Obviously, Poulsen cannot specifically request

that the trial court allow such evidence and now claim that its
admission was improper and that the prosecutor's remarks concerning
the evidence were inappropriate.
Also, the circumstances of the arrest were first raised by
Poulsen in her opening argument.

Once she had raised the issue

before the jury and had described the conduct of the arresting
officers as "unreasonable and irrational," the City was entitled to
present evidence to establish the reason that Poulsen was taken
into custody.
Finally, the remarks of the prosecutor in closing argument
were fair characterizations of the evidence that had been properly
admitted,

including

evidence

of

deceptive

and

inconsistent

statements by Poulsen.
IV.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING STRICT
LIABILITY AND THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
OF "ANIMALS RUNNING AT LARGE" ACCURATELY
REFLECT THE LAW.

The jury instruction regarding strict liability is an accurate
presentation of the law.

This instruction was appropriate since

the plain language of the ordinance makes it a strict liability
offense.
The jury instruction regarding the elements of the crime of
"animals

running at

large" is an accurate

description

of

elements of the crime that the City was required to prove.
8

the
The

instruction

was

appropriate

for

this

case

and

was

properly

presented to the jury.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE PROPERLY DENIED
POULSEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE CITY'S CASE IN CHIEF,
SINCE SUFFICIENT FACTS HAD BEEN PLACED
INTO EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE
CASE.

At the conclusion of the prosecution's case in chief, Poulsen
moved for a dismissal of the charges against her on the basis that
the prosecution had presented insufficient evidence to establish a
prima

facie

case against her.

Transcript, p. 79.

Following

argument, the trial court judge correctly denied Poulsen's motion.
Transcript, p. 90.
The uncontroverted evidence before the court at that time
included the following facts:
1.

At approximately

1:30

a.m.,

Officer

Cox of the West

Valley City Police Department observed six to eight horses running
loose at approximately 2700 South 7000 West in West Valley City.
Transcript, pp. 15-16.
2.

Officer Cox testified that he momentarily lost contact

with the horses while chasing them in conjunction with several Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Deputies.

Transcript, pp. 22, 28.

However,

Officer Cox did locate the animals as they were entering a pasture
located

slightly outside the City border.
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Transcript, p. 23.

Officer Cox further testified that he recognized the horses to be
the same animals he had been following.
3.

Transcript, p. 31.

Officer Cox also testified that Poulsen was present at

the pasture, assisting in directing the horses into a fenced area.
Transcript, pp. 24-25.
4.

West Valley

City Animal Control Officer

Stan

Larsen

testified that when he arrived at the pasture, Poulsen was in the
process of directing the horses into the pasture area and repairing
the fence.
5.

Transcript, pp. 38, 40-41.
Officer Larsen testified that he had a conversation with

Poulsen in which she stated that she was not the owner of the
horses, but that she knew who was.

When Officer Larsen questioned

Poulsen about the identity of the owner, Poulsen responded with a
name that was unintelligible to him.
Officer

Transcript, pp. 42, 66.

When

Larsen asked Poulsen to repeat the name, she refused.

Transcript, p. 66.

During

their

conversation,

Poulsen warned

Larsen that one of the horses had a tendency to kick and another
was blind in one eye, thereby establishing her familiarity with the
horses.

Transcript, pp. 41, 72.

Poulsen also warned Larsen that

it was dangerous to go into the pasture area.

Transcript, pp. 70-

71.
6.

Officer

Larsen testified

that

arrived at the scene by separate vehicle.

Poulsen's daughter
Transcript, p. 43.

had
He

observed her jump onto the back of one of the horses and ride it
bareback, with no halter or reins, to the rear of the pasture, and
10

then observed her unloading food for the horses from her vehicle.
Transcript, pp. 44-45.
7.

Officer Larsen also testified that he had consulted with

a Utah State Brand Inspector, and that following that conversation,
he

did

not

continue

Transcript, p. 77.

to

look

for

the

owner

of

the

The clear implication of Officer

horses.
Larsen's

testimony was that he was satisfied that Poulsen was the owner of
the horses.

This was later confirmed by the testimony of Officer

Prisbrey of the West Valley City Police Department.

Transcript,

pp. 107, 120.
Based on the facts, which clearly established that the horses
were running at large within the boundaries of West Valley City and
that Poulsen was in a position of either being the owner of the
horses or being the person having charge, care, custody, or control
of the horses, the judge properly denied her motion.

It was not

necessary for the City to prove a mental element to the crime,
since the City's "animals running at large" ordinance is a strict
liability offense.
Following the judge's denial of Poulsen's motion, additional
critical evidence was presented during Poulsen's case in chief that
clearly supported the jury's verdict.

Of particular note, Officer

Prisbrey, a defense witness, testified that Poulsen admitted to him
that she was responsible for the horses, and then later admitted
that she was the owner of four of the horses.

11

Transcript, pp. 107,

120.

None of this evidence was rebutted or challenged by the

defense, and, ultimately, was the only evidence before the jury.
II.

SECTION 23-5-102 OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OVERBROAD.

Section 23-5-102 of the West Valley City Municipal Code is
clearly not overbroad, since it does not prohibit constitutionally
State

protected activity while prohibiting unprotected behavior.
v.

Frampton,

7 37 P.2d 183 (Utah 19 87).

The ordinance applies only

to those limited circumstances defined by its elements and does not
sweep innocent conduct into a criminal act.
The ownership or charge, care, custody, or control of an
animal is not prohibited.
care,

custody,

or

It is only when the ownership or charge,

control

qualities

are

combined

with

the

circumstance of the animal's running at large that a criminal act
occurs.
In this case, Poulsen's argument that the language of the
ordinance may criminalize innocent conduct has no standing.

A

person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot
challenge the statute on the grounds that it conceivably may be
applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the
court.

Broadrick

v.

Oklahoma,

37 L. Ed. 2d 830, 839 (1973).

413 U.S. 601, 610; 93 S. Ct. 2908;
This ordinance is not overbroad as

it related to the facts of this case.

Officer Prisbrey testified

that Poulsen admitted to him that she was the owner of four of the
horses.

That testimony was completely uncontrover ted.
12

Officer

Cox, also in testimony that was wholly uncontroverted, testified
that those same animals were personally observed by him to be
running loose in West Valley City.

Given those facts, the plain

language of Section 23-5-102 is not unconstitutionally broad as
applied to Poulsen.

She was the owner of four animals that had

been observed running at large and, therefore, was found guilty of
four of the six counts brought against her.

Also, Poulsen has

articulated no basis for believing that allowing an animal to run
at large is a constitutionally protected activity.
The plain language of the statute does not punish or prohibit
the

conduct

of

parties

that

falls

outside

of

the

specific

prohibitions of the ordinance as set forth in its elements.
language of the ordinance at issue is clear and unambiguous.

The
It

simply prohibits a person who is in ownership or control of an
animal to let the animal run at large.

Poulsen has not shown that

the ordinance is overbroad on its face, in its application to her,
or that it impinges on a constitutionally protected right.
III. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF POULSEN'S ARREST AND
INCARCERATION,
AND
THE
PROSECUTOR'S
REMARKS RELATING TO THAT EVIDENCE, WERE
PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT AT
THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF POULSEN.
Poulsen complains that trial court improperly allowed the
evidence presented by the prosecution relative to her arrest and
subsequent

incarceration.

She

further

asserts

that

the

prosecutor's reference to that evidence in closing argument was
13

improper.

This argument is based upon a gross misrepresentation of

the proceedings before the trial court.
At a prior hearing, the City had stipulated not to present
evidence regarding the reasons that Poulsen was arrested rather
than merely issued a citation.

However, at the pretrial argument

on July 5, 1994, Poulsen specifically requested that the trial
court

allow

such

evidence.

At

her

request,

the

previous

stipulation and order of the court was dissolved, and the court
stated:
Court:

That order is stricken based on your
statements to the Court that you want to
be free to raise the issue, if this is

what you choose and you are not
to the prosecutor
raising
the
well.
Poulsen:

objecting
issue
as

We will proceed on that basis.
Thank you, your Honor.

Record, p. 295 (emphasis added).
A copy of the relevant sections of the Record, pages 290-295, is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
At trial, Poulsen did not object to testimony about the arrest
until the discrepancies in her statements about having a driver's
license appeared to be damaging to her.

Obviously, Poulsen cannot

specifically request that the trial court allow evidence regarding
the arrest and then selectively exclude that which she does not
wish the jury to hear.

Furthermore, she obviously cannot request

that the evidence be allowed and now claim, before this Court, that

14

its

admission was

improper

and

that

the prosecutor's

remarks

concerning the evidence were inappropriate.
Even at trial, the circumstances regarding Poulsen's arrest
were initially raised by Poulsen herself.

In her opening argument,

Poulsen stated:
. . . these officers acted in an unreasonable
and un-- irrational [sic] manner, and that all
they cared about that night was simply that
they got someone, just anyone.
As a matter of fact, I've been told I was the
only one that has ever been arrested and taken
into custody for this offense.
Transcript, p. 10.
Poulsen also stated in her opening, "This little boy lost his
mother for 22 hours while she sat in jail."

Transcript, p. 12.

Having raised the issue before the jury that her arrest was
unique or unusual, and having alleged that the police officers who
arrested her acted unreasonably and irrationally, the City, in
reliance upon the pretrial argument agreement, was entitled to
provide an explanation of the reasons for the arrest.

The City's

explanation was presented by way of direct examination of Animal
Control Officer Larsen.

Officer Larsen testified that it was his

intention to issue Poulsen a citation and to release her at the
scene.

Transcript, p. 52.

However, Poulsen was unable to produce

identification, refused to give her date of birth, and provided the
officer with two addresses.

Officer Larsen testified that Poulsen

originally stated she had apparently lost her driver's license and
15

that she began to search for it in the pasture, using a flashlight.
He further testified that a check by radio revealed that Poulsen in
fact did not have a driver's license.

Transcript, pp. 49-52.

Based upon Poulsen's lack of cooperation with regard to the
information needed for the citation, Officer Prisbrey eventually
placed her under arrest.

In a situation such as this, the officer

has little choice but to choose arrest rather than citation.

When

an officer issues a citation to an individual whose identity he is
unsure of, there is a great risk that the citation is being issued
in the wrong name and that, subsequently, the offender cannot be
found or will not appear in court.

In addition, in this case the

officer believed Poulsen to be deceptive regarding her driver's
license.

She first claimed to have one, apparently did not, and

then became evasive when further questioned.
100.

Transcript, pp. 99-

The only way to assure Poulsen's appearance on the charges

was to take her into custody.

The prosecution presented these

facts in order to rebut the allegations raised by Poulsen in her
opening statement that the officers had acted unreasonably and
irrationally, and that the arrest had been unusual.
Following the prosecution's brief presentation

(Transcript,

pp. 49-52), and consistent with her pretrial argument statement
that "I think that it is going to greatly help my case in showing
that these officers acted terribly unreasonable

..."

(Record,

p. 294), Poulsen seemed fascinated with the subject of her arrest.
She

repeatedly

questioned

Officer
16

Larsen

on

cross-examination

regarding the circumstances of her arrest, and also raised the
issue in her direct examination of Officer Prisbrey, who she called
as a defense witness.

Poulsen seemed much more interested in

delving into the reasons for her arrest than in presenting evidence
regarding the "animals running at large" charges.

At one point

during her direct examination of Officer Prisbrey, the City finally
felt compelled to object to the line of testimony.

This occurred

during the following exchange:
Q (POULSEN)

A (PRISBREY)
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
MR STONEY:

MS. POULSEN:
COURT:

Now, Officer Larsen said that
he was going
to issue a
citation?
Yes.
And I gave him my name?
You gave him a name, yes.
And I gave him an address?
You gave him two addresses.
And I gave him a phone number?
You did.
And there's only two things
that I wouldn't give him; is
that correct?
I wouldn't know how to answer
that question. I'm sorry.
I did give him a phone number?
Yes. You did.
Now, are you able to check an
address out by a phone number?
Uh huh. In most cases.
And so you have that available
to you?
In most cases.
Your Honor, may I ask what the
relevance is of all of this? What
does it have to do with horses
running at large?
Establishing
foundation
of
truthfulness.
All right. Proceed.

Transcript, pp. 97-98.
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A close reading of the Transcript reveals that by far, the
bulk of

the evidence presented

regarding

the circumstances of

Poulsen's arrest were presented by Poulsen herself.

Transcript,

pp. 54-63, 66-67, 73-77, 93-105, 114-118.
At closing argument, the prosecutor made several references to
Poulsen's deceptiveness.

These references were based in part upon

Poulsen's statements concerning her driver's license, where she had
first claimed to have a driver's license, which claim later proved
to be false.

But, there was other independent evidence presented

that indicated contradicting statements by Poulsen and that support
the prosecutor's

remarks.

These

statements

include

Poulsen's

assertion to Officer Larsen that she was not the owner of the
horses and her later admission to Officer Prisbrey that she was in
fact

the owner

testified

he

of

four

of the horses.

felt

that

Poulsen

was

Also, Officer

being

deceptive

Larsen

when

provided him with the alleged name of the owner of the horses.

she
He

stated that she said the name quickly and unintelligibly and would
not repeat it for him.
Finally, Poulsen's own witness, Officer Prisbrey, testified he
felt that Poulsen was being deceptive.

The Transcript reveals the

following:
Q (POULSEN)
A (PRISBREY)
Q

And up to that point, did you
have reason to not believe me?
Relative to what?
Relative to the fact that I
gave to you my name, I gave you
an
address,
reasonable
explanation and a phone number.
18

A

Okay.
But to believe or
disbelieve you relative to
what?
What would make you think I
hadn't given you the correct
information?
You--in my mind, I felt that
you were being deceptive.
In what way?
When I asked you for your
driver's
license
and
identification, initially you
said that you must have dropped
it somewhere in the pasture.
You borrowed my flashlight, you
spent approximately ten minutes
looking for it.
When we attempted to have
dispatch locate a driver's
license for you, they were
unable to do so under the name
that you gave me.
At which
point, I asked you if you had a
driver's license, you said,
well, I didn't say I had a Utah
driver's license. I asked you
if you had a driver's license
anywhere in America, you would
not answer that.
I felt that you were deceptive
about your identification.
Do
you
believe
I'm
Lynn
Poulsen?
I honestly don't know who you
are. To this day, I don't know
who you are.

Q
A
Q
A

Q
A

Transcript, pp. 99-100.
Poulsen specifically requested that the trial judge reverse
the

previous

stipulation,

order
and

that

then

had

been

proceeded

to

based
raise

upon
the

the

parties'

circumstances

surrounding her arrest in her opening statement to the jury.

In

response, the City provided testimony regarding the reasons why
19

Poulsen

was

arrested,

taken

into

custody,

and

incarcerated.

Following the City's initial explanation, the bulk of the testimony
concerning the circumstances of the arrest, including the issues
related

to the driver's license, was elicited by Poulsen both

through

cross-examination

of prosecution

examination of her own witnesses.

witnesses

and

direct

Having initially raised the

issue and having presented the bulk of the evidence on this issue,
Poulsen cannot now claim that such evidence was improperly admitted
by the trial court.

Further, the prosecutor's remarks in closing

argument, which consisted of pointing out the inconsistencies in
Poulsen's statements, were entirely proper, and Poulsen did not
object to such statements at trial.
IV.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING STRICT
LIABILITY AND THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
OF "ANIMALS RUNNING AT LARGE" ACCURATELY
REFLECT THE LAW.

The record reveals no objection to the jury instructions as
they were read to the jury.

However, Poulsen now raises an issue

with regard to jury instructions #15 and #16, and claims that they
misstate the law.
Jury instruction #15 accurately states the elements of the
crime that must be found by the jury in order to convict Poulsen.
These elements, as set forth in jury instruction #15, state:
(1)
(2)
(3)

That
on or
about
the
15 th
February, 1994;
In West Valley City;
The defendant, Lynn Poulsen;

20

day

of

(4)

Had charge, care, custody or control of
any animal and allowed such animal to run
at large.

Transcript, p. 152.
Jury
Section

instruction #15 accurately describes the elements of

23-5-102, West Valley

City Municipal

Code.

The City

carried the burden of proof that on the specified date, in West
Valley City, animals within the charge, care, custody, or control
of Lynn Poulsen were running at large.

The evidence at trial,

including the testimony by Officer Prisbrey that Poulsen admitted
ownership of four of the animals, adequately supported the jury's
finding of guilt on four of the six charges.
Jury instruction #16 explains the concept of strict liability
to the jury.

Since Section 23-5-102, West Valley City Municipal

Code, states clearly on its face that it is a strict liability
offense, as required by Section 76-2-102, Utah Code Annotated, this
instruction

is

entirely

appropriate,

and

Poulsen's

arguments

otherwise are without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the City respectfully requests that
Poulsen's appeal be denied, and that the convictions be affirmed.
DATED this 10th day of July, 1996.
WEST VALLEY CITY

WO Mr
J.\jRichard Catten, Senior Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit A:

Record, pp. 290-295

11 determine the location of the animals' owner, the county will determine the
2
3
4
5

ownership.
If they are unable to locate the ownership within a reasonable time, then it can
be disposed of.
The whole time, it refers to the county. Under the municipal code

6

construction, it states that the code will be strictly construed and that county means

7

Salt Lake County.

8
9
10

Therefore, your Honor, I would move the dismiss on the fact that I don't think
the city has the right to prosecute this.
I know it's been brought to the attention of this Court before. I want this on

11

record so that everybody is well aware that everything states that there must a contract

12

with the city. Contract means that there is a written agreement.

13

To my knowledge, there is none.

14

I have requested it, and there isn't any. You might say, every single bit of

15

information that I have gleaned throughout the whole state code, states that it will be

16

the "county's duty and not the city's." I would move to dismiss this on that. If the

17

county wishes to prosecute me, they can, ... they know where I live.

18

Court: Well, as you state, this has already been before the Court. I am going

19

to stand on the decision to dismiss, to deny the move to dismiss on the basis that you

20

raise. I am also going to not demand an order and stipulation as to the definition of

21

the terms charge, care, custody or control as you have suggested. I believe that the

22

language in the statute is plain and should be understandable and I think, frankly, by

23

attempting to integrate the different meaning would more likely confuse the jury than

24

to assist the jury and so we will not require the stipulation. Are we prepared to go

25

forward?

26

Poulsen: I have one more matter before the Court. It also states that the city

27
28

13

11 shall state that the duties of the pound keeper are. I have called the city and have
2

asked for the duties of the pound keeper and they gave me a copy of their codes ...

3

which was very old ... and in there ... I found no authority for arrest.

4

In further talking with, ... being taken into custody, ... and further talking with

5

Barbara Carr, she stated that she had never known of a person who was arrested. My

6

question goes to, ... if it is not within the duties of the pound keeper to cite a person

7

outside of their city, then was the arrest lawful and the custody taken and I would ask

8

for a determination of that.

9

I believe that I have asserted standing and I believe that there is questionable

10

facts before the Court that it states that it will ... state his duties within the city's

11

boundaries.

12

I realize that this is probably like, I don't know, a citizen's arrest or something,

13

but the police officer's report clearly states that it did it under direction of ... the

14

arrest under the direction of the pound keeper.

15

If that is correct, and it was done under this authority, then I would like to see

16

what the duties of the pound keeper are and if they would indeed have the duty to

17

have somebody take me into custody for animals at large.

18

The officer gave conclusive testimony, he stated, on the stand, "you were

19

arrested for not cooperating with the police officer and for failing to have

20

identification."

21

I haven't been charged with either one of those. I have been charged with

22

"Animals at Large." I would like the determination as to the validity of the arrest that

23

was made and if it was proper and pursuant to the fact that under the reasonable

24

suspicion statute, it states an officer may ask for your name, address, and an

25

explanation.

26

It also states that he can ... that he hadn't had reason to believe that I would

27
28

14

11 flee or destroy evidence, injury another person.
2
3

It also states here that ... I also told him and he states in this report, that I told
him I was born again.

4
5

It also states that I gave him all truthful information because they certainly are
not citing me with false information.

6

The fact of the matter is, ... I wonder if the officer, ... if the animal control

7

officer, indeed had the right to have me arrested for that charge, or just release me on

8

the citation and also if the officer had the right to make the arrest when I had given

9

him all the information that was authorized by statute?

10

Court: Is this a matter that has been before the Court previously or are you

11 just raising it for the first time?
12

Poulsen: No, your Honor. This ... I started to bring this up and the reason

13

why is because of probably cause because several times I've mentioned that I stated

14

that I was arrested on that, I wasn't just cited. I was arrested. It seems to me that I

15

have a certain standing to have the determination of their arrest brought before the

16

Court and if there is not validity to the fact that I was arrested, then a determination

17

of if it was a false arrest.

18

I am wondering, ... and I am sure the Court must wonder also, where it says to

19

prescribe this duties, if indeed an animal control officer has the right and duty to have

20

a person arrested.

21

Or, is he just given the authority to cite a person and release them on citation.

22

Court: Is this going to be an issue, Mr. Stoney, to be brought before the jury

23

today?

24

Stoney: The arrest, your Honor?

25

Court: Yes.

26

Stoney: I don't know that it has anything to do with anything we are talking

27
28

15

11 about today.
2

Court: Well, what's troubling me is we are holding a jury, this is not

3

something that has been filed timely, whether you have an independent basis to have

4

standing for false arrest or not.

5
6
7

Fin not going to cite, off the top of my head, without giving both yourself and
the city a chance to brief it.
But it seems to me that it is not something that we are going to be taking up in

8

this jury trial. What I am going to do is suggest that you reserve that argument.

9

Certainly I am not going to prejudice you from making it, but, try not to entertain it

10

this morning without having any notice to the Court previously and delay the jury

11 from getting on with this case.
12
13
14
15
16
17

Stoney: I understood, your Honor, that I was under an order not to talk about
the fact that she was taken into custody.
Court: That's my understanding of the order that was entered the last time we
were here and I think that's where I want this to stand.
Poulsen: Your Honor, there were timely objections filed for this, but they have
never been addressed by the Court.

18

I thought this was a substantial issue.

19

I was not the one who made that motion. The city didn't even put in a motion

20

to not have the arrest brought up. The Court just simply granted the city's request.

21

They have never filed a motion whatsoever before this Court, they just simply were

22

granted the request.

23

Court: You made a motion for in limine ...

24

Poulsen: Simply on the fact that a refusal to get a birth|pte is not required by

25
26

any ordinance or a statue, ... required under the law, ... that was all.
Stoney: You want to be mentioned then? I understood at the hearing that the

27
28

16

11 city was attempting to accommodate you and discussing with the Court what they were
2

prepared not to mention to avoid prejudicing you. That was my understanding that

3

was happening.

4

Poulsen: Your Honor, all I ask was that the fact that my birthrate, that I

5

refused to give my birthrate to the officers because it was religious belief and then I

6

would have to explain my religious belief and right to assert my birthrate to them.

7

The city is the one who misrepresented that to the Court and stated, "Oh, I

8

think she is just a little upset about being taken into custody and we won't bring that

9

up."

10

I think that it is going to gready help my case in showing that these officers

11

acted terribly unreasonable and under the circumstances, that I was the only person

12

that West Valley can think of that has been arrested for Animals at Large.

13

Also, this is the basis of my motion to suppress. These officers, they were

14

threatening and coercive, there was a lot of reasons why there should be a motion to

15

suppress the presents of numerous officers.

16

I presented Utah law and the strict fact that they have certain requirements, I

17

need to bring all these up before I go to trial even though I may have addressed them

18

before. It is my understanding, according to Justice Zimmerman. I am bringing this

19

up because I believe it is a valid issue.

20

I have the duties of animal control and there is nothing in there that says that

21

they can arrest. I was arrested. I think I have an asserted standing through my

22

objections, that have not been addressed.

23

Stoney: If she wants to make the motion at the appropriate time in the trial and

24

then make an argument, I don't have an objection to that and I will be happy to go

25

ahead and mention the fact that she was arrested to the jury so that we can get on with

26

this today.

27
28

17

1J

Court: Would that satisfy you?

2

Poulsen: Is that a fact then that whether the animal officer had a right to

3

arrest?

4
5

Stoney: You can bring that up at the appropriate time, Lynn. That's what I'm
saying.

6

Poulsen: Maybe I don't the appropriate time, being pro se.

7

Stoney: Unfortunately for you, it is not the Court's job or my job to tell you

8

that.

9
10

Poulsen: So, I can assert that and raise a question for the jury to decide?
Court: What you can raise is your defense subject to the objections of Mr.

11 Stoney, the prosecutor, just as if you can object to his case and I will rule under
12 relevancy at the time.
13

I am not going to pre-judge the issue at this point to the extent that there was

14 an order in place that that was not to be mentioned.
15

That order is stricken based on your statements to the Court that you want to be

16 free to raise the issue, if this is what you choose and you are not objecting to the
17 prosecutor raising the issue as well.
18

We will proceed on that basis.

19

Poulsen: Thank you, your Honor.

20

Court: Are we ready to .... I wanted to make a statement on record that aspect

21 of this.
22

There was a motion to disqualify this trial, the proceeding of the Court, which

23 by the rules that allows the judge to review that if the Court doesn't believe that there
24

is a prejudice which exists and that process was completed from Judge Thome, ... he

25 denied the motion. There were some representations made in the affidavit as to
26 comments that Mr. Stoney made to Ms. Poulsen about my views about her on the
27
28

18

